University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 38
Number 1 Fall 2007

Article 8

2007

Recent Developments: Etape v. Chertoff: Federal
Courts Retain Exclusive Jurisdiction When a
Naturalization Applicant Files a Timely Petition for
Review of a Naturalization Application Pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1447(B)
Michael Gillman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gillman, Michael (2007) "Recent Developments: Etape v. Chertoff: Federal Courts Retain Exclusive Jurisdiction When a
Naturalization Applicant Files a Timely Petition for Review of a Naturalization Application Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B)," University
of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 38 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol38/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

ETAPE V. CHERTOFF: FEDERAL COURTS RETAIN
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WHEN A NATURALIZATION
APPLICANT FILES A TIMELY PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
A NATURALIZATION APPLICATION PURSUANT TO
8 U.S.c. § 1447(B).
By: Michael Gillman

In a matter of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction when a naturalization applicant timely files a petition in
federal court pursuant to 8 U.S.c. § 1447(b) (2000). Etape v. Chertoff,
497 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2007). More specifically, a federal court will
not be divested of its power when the United States Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS") fails to make a timely
ruling on a naturalization application. Id. at 379.
Max Alobwede Etape ("Etape") and Sawsan Abdul Rahim
("Rahim") both filed naturalization requests with the CIS and
appeared for their examinations. Etape filed his application on April
2,2003 and appeared for his initial examination on September 9,2003.
Upon arrival, Etape was issued a continuance letter requesting
additional documentation. Thereafter, he filed the documentation and
requested that CIS resume adjudication of his application. After
twenty months had elapsed since his application, Etape exercised his
right to petition in the district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)
("section 1447(b)"). On October 18, 2005, CIS denied Etape's
application before the district court acted upon the motion. Rahim
filed her application on January 18, 2005 and appeared for her
examination on June 14, 2005. When more than 120 days had
elapsed, Rahim filed a petition under section 1447(b). On February
28, 2006, before the district court could act upon her petition, CIS
denied her application.
In both cases, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland dismissed the pending petitions as moot. The district court
reasoned that its ability to consider the petitions depended on the
applications that were undecided by CIS. When CIS denied the
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applications, the petitions were rendered moot. The district court also
concluded that section 1447(b) did not deprive the CIS of jurisdiction
over Etape's and Rahim's applications after they had filed petitions in
federal court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit consolidated the two cases and reviewed de novo the district
court's grant of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1).
The Fourth Circuit utilized United States v. Hovsepian in its
analysis. Etape, 497 F.3d at 382. In United States v. Hovsepian, the
Ninth Circuit held that section 1447(b) vested exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal district court and prevented CIS from further action on an
application until the court remands the matter back to CIS. Etape, 497
F.3d at 382 (citing United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). The Fourth Circuit agreed with Hovsepian
and held that section 1447(b) established exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts. Etape, 497 F.3d at 381. The Court examined the
language of the statute, determined the proper interpretation of that
language, and investigated the language of section 1447(b) in the
larger statutory context. Etape, 497 F.3d at 382.
The Court began by examining the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 383. The language of section 1447(b) provides the district courts
with two options once it has obtained jurisdiction. Etape, 497 F.3d at
383. The district courts can either "'determine the matter,''' or it may
'''remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the [CIS] to
determine the matter. '" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting section
1447(b)). Based on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court
concluded that a district court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
until the circuit court remands the matter back to CIS if it should
choose to do so. Etape, 497 F.3d at 383. Any other reading of the
statute would inappropriately result in the administrative agency's
action divesting the district court of its congressionally authorized
jurisdiction. Etape, 497 F.3d at 383-84.
Next, the Court interpreted the significance of the word "remand"
in section 1447(b). Etape, 497 F.3d at 383-84. The power of
"remand" is given to a court so that it may send the matter back to its
origin for some further action, which clearly defines a hierarchal
structure between the courts and agencies. Etape, 497 F .3d at 384.
The Court stated that Congress would not have granted district courts
the power to remand if applications remained with CIS after the matter
was filed in federal court. Id. The Court observed that otherwise there
would be no need for the district court to remand the case because CIS
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would retain jurisdiction. Id. In addition, the Court detennined that
such a situation would severely limit the district court's power to
remand. Id. Congress gave the power to the district court to remand a
case to CIS "with appropriate instructions." Id. The Court refused to
interpret a statute in a manner which would render some of its
language meaningless. Id.
The Court then examined the statutory context of section 1447(b),
which was enacted as part of the Immigration Act of 1990 (the "Act").
Etape, 497 F.3d at 385. The Fourth Circuit held that the Act, as a
whole, vests a district court with exclusive jurisdiction over a
naturalization application. Id. at 385. Section 1447(b) was enacted as
part of an effort to streamline the naturalization process by giving
authority to the Attorney General to naturalize citizens without
pennission from a district court. Id at 385-86. However, Congress
also recognized the district courts' long-standing power over
naturalization applications. Id. at 386. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
detennined that district courts retained their power to review
applications under the Act. Id. The Court reasoned that the
Legislature intended to ensure that district courts have the final say
regarding naturalization applicants. Id.
The Court next examined 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which states that an
applicant for naturalization has a choice of either having the oath of
the allegiance given by the Attorney General or by an eligible court.
Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. Congress enacted section 1447(b) for the
same reason that it enacted section 1421(c). Etape, 497 F.3d at 386.
Congress' intention in enacting section 1421(c) was to assure that any
judicial review rights given to applicants in previous legislation were
not taken away. Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. The Court detennined that it
was the applicant and not the government who decides the place,
setting, and time frame in which the application is processed. Id.
Judicial review affords the applicant this power. Id.
The Court concluded that the "twin congressional goals of
streamlining" the naturalization process while retaining an applicant's
judicial rights, as well as the applicant's ability to choose the forum
that will adjudicate his or her application, are consistent with its
holding that section 1447(b) vests the district court with exclusive
jurisdiction. Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. The dissent argued that this
holding severely diminishes the importance of CIS's expertise and
purpose in the naturalization application process. Id. The majority
responded that CIS's investigatory functions occur before or during
the initial naturalization exam, and those exams always occur before
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the district court obtains jurisdiction. Id. Congress set up this system
so that CIS can, and must, employ its expertise before a district court
can act, and only when it fails to act can a court obtain jurisdiction. Id.
at 386-87. This holding merely furthers congressional intent to allow
an applicant to choose where and when his or her application will be
heard. Id. at 386. Because these cases presented a matter of first
impression, the Court decided to apply this decision retroactively only
to those cases still open on direct review. Id. at 388.
By holding that a district court retains exclusive jurisdiction over a
properly filed section 1447(b) motion, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is asserting that it will use a strict
statutory interpretation to deduce Congress' intent when enacting a
statute. The Court shows its willingness to aid those applicants who
have been kept waiting for an unreasonable amount of time by
allowing them to retain control over when and where their application
is adjudicated. In addition, the holding also shows the reluctance with
which the Court will cede absolute power to an administrative agency.
While the Court recognizes the importance of efficiency by delegating
some authority to CIS, it still desires to maintain the power to review
some types of applications. By retaining a power of review over some
of the applications, the Court was able to preserve Congress' intention
that the judiciary should maintain some control over naturalization
applications. This holding will also affect many currently pending
naturalization applications on direct review. It will encourage CIS to
process naturalization applicants in a more timely and efficient
manner, as CIS knows for certain that there is the possibility it will
lose the authority to render a decision on an application which is not
acted upon expeditiously.

